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Abstract. Electricity is one of the crucial energies of modern 
society, but it is greatly threatened by various kinds of 
menaces, especially natural hazards. Although they rarely 
happen, their occurrence may hugely affect the operation of 
power system. In this paper, we firstly, according the impact 
on power systems, classify natural threats into two categories 
(natural disasters and extreme weather conditions) and 
several subcategories (geological, hydrological, 
meteorological and climatological). Then the changes in 
natural threats to power systems and their trends during 
recent decades are discussed, along with a review of events 
that pose natural threats to the power system. Finally, the 
georeferenced model based on the Italy transmission system 
for natural threats analysis is presented.  
Keywords: Natural threats, Georeferenced model, Steady state 
contingency analysis, Italian power system 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Electricity system, widely exposed to the natural 
environment, is vulnerable to different threats such as 
natural threats, accidental threats, and malicious threats 
[1]. Many natural disasters recorded in history already 
demonstrated their considerably negative impacts on 
power systems [2]. For example, Hurricane Katrina, 
according to the survey of National Climatic Data 
Center, caused over 1.7 million people without 
electricity for several weeks and the total economic 
losses were estimated to exceed 100 G$ [3]. Wenchuan 
earthquake in China, disturbed the operation of 21 power 
plants with total installed capacity of 3.2GW and led to 
about 140 G$ economic losses [4, 5].  
 
Global economic losses caused by natural disasters are 
on the rise [4]. Basically, the increasing need of 
electricity due to the growth of population and the 
relative use and the development of power systems have 
resulted in increasing damages due to natural disasters. It 
is, however, difficult to quantify the impact of the 
climate change effect up to now because the related 
events are exceptional. Therefore, multiple 
countermeasures, such as new investment, protection 
plans, emergency action plans are developed with 
acceptable costs to limit the impacts of unexpected 
detrimental events. Although it is obvious that power 
systems would suffer great damages from natural 
disasters, it is hard to improve the power transmission 
system security against natural disasters in the short run, 
as the investment in power system reinforcement is a 
long-term project. For example, building a high voltage 
transmission line on average takes 10 to 15 years (the 
timelines includes planning, scoping, mapping, 
environmental review, public comment, project 
approval, permitting, land acquisition and construction) 
[6]. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
ramification of natural threats on power systems and 
develop proper approaches and tools to efficiently 
identify and further reduce the negative consequences. 
 
Studies about natural threats on power systems already 
drew much attention. Reference [7] briefly introduced 
worldwide natural disasters resulting in serious damage 
to the energy infrastructure, loss of lives and properties. 
Reference [8] introduced an earthquake happened on 
August 17, 1999 in Turkey, which destructively affected 
the Turkish power system. The total loss of load roughly 
reached to 7.0 GW, which was about 30% of a total load 
of Turkey. Reference [9] concluded how a catastrophic 
winter storm affected power system in China.  From 
January to February in 2008, south part of China has 
suffered from the most destructive winter storm since 
1920 and experienced large-scaled blackouts in Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Yunnan and Guangdong provinces. The total 
losing power amounted to 6,209 GW. Those papers only 
used statistics to present the loss related to power 
systems. In this paper, we established a georeferenced 
transmission network model combining a realistic static 
power system model and geographic information system 
to provide an effective tool to enhance the visualization 
of natural threats against the operation of power systems. 
More specifically, this model can offer illustrative 
diagrams to intuitive recognize the affected areas and 
system operational security situation after some adverse 
natural events happen. In some cases, it is necessary to 
conduct dynamic studies to understand the associated 
stability problems. However, the dynamic simulation is 
only meaningful after we can achieve a static operation 
point.  
 
The remainder of this paper is composed as follows. In 
Section 2, we provide a classification of natural threats 
and discuss their possible impact. In Section 3 and 4, we 
discuss the evolution of natural threats and present a list 
of past natural-related failures in the power system. In 
Section 5, we introduce the georeferenced model of 
power transmission systems based on the Italian case. In 
addition, we provide the security analysis against two 
natural events as examples, which are cooperated with 
the Italian transmission system operator. Some 
conclusive remarks are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. NATURAL THREATS AGAINST POWER 
SYSTEMS: CLASSIFICATION AND IMPACT 
 
Various definitions of natural threats have been proposed 
before. Reference [10] suggested that, from the 
geographic perspective, the natural threats are the 
potential negative damages on the earth caused by the 
natural disasters such as earthquake, tsunami, flood, etc., 
while a natural disaster is the extreme hazardous event 
that occurs to influence on communities causing 
disruption, damage, and casualties, and the affected 
communities cannot function normally without additional 
assistance. Reference [11] defined them as all 
atmospheric, hydrologic, geologic and wildfire 
phenomena that, has the potential to affect the human 
health, activities or even the constructions.  
 
In this paper, considering the involvement of power 
system, we define natural threats as a potential event or a 
set of events happen around the world with different 
scales (local, national, continental) and different short 
time frames (instantaneously, minutes, days), and it is not 
directly involved in human’s activities but it would affect 
the operation of power systems with a large scale 
disruption of electricity supply.  
 
 
Figure 1. Classification of natural threats 
Based on the definition of natural threats, we proposed a 
classification for studying their impact on electricity 
infrastructures. Natural threats can be classified into two 
main categories (disaster and extreme weather condition) 
and several sub-categories (geological, hydrological, 
meteorological, and climatological). Figure 1 shows the 
classification of the most typical natural threats against 
the secure operation of power systems. 
 
It should be noted that the difference between 
“meteorology” and “climatology” mainly lies in the time 
perspective. Meteorology is intended to indicate the 
weather conditions over the short-term while climatology 
employs a long-term perspective [2].  
 
With references to Figure 1, the sub-category can be 
further defined as follows. An earthquake is the ground 
shaking caused by movement under the earth’s surface 
[12]. A volcanic eruption means a volcano sends out ash 
clouds, lava and even volcanic bombs [11]. A landslide 
refers to masses of rock, earth or debris moving down a 
slope [11]. An avalanche is a mass of snow, often mixed 
with ice and debris which travels down mountainsides, 
destroying all in its path [11]. A tsunami is a series of 
enormous waves created by an underwater disturbance 
[11]. Geomagnetic storms are created when the ionized 
particles carried by the solar wind because of coronal 
mass ejections or coronal holes at the Sun are captured by 
Earth's magnetic field [13]. A flood is a land covered by 
water that is not usually covered by water [14]. A tropical 
cyclone is a rotating, organized system of clouds and 
thunderstorms that originate over tropical or subtropical 
waters and has a closed low-level circulation (Hurricane, 
tornado, and typhoon are the same phenomena in 
different places) [15]. A heat wave is an extended period 
of extreme heat and is often accompanied by high 
humidity [14]. A winter storm is an event in which the 
main types of precipitation are snow, sleet or freezing 
rain [14].  A drought is a lengthy period of time, 
stretching months or even years in which time land has a 
decrease in water supply [14]. 
 
Bulk power systems are easily threatened by natural 
disasters due to the large exposure to the environment. 
However, the components of a power system such as 
generator, transformer, substation, overhead line, cable, 
control center, etc., can be affected differently by natural 
threats [16]. In general, earthquakes could damage all 
power system equipment, and are most likely to cause 
power interruptions lasting more than a few days. 
Tropical cyclones primarily affect transmission and local 
distribution systems, while floods could damage the 
generating equipment as well. Although heat waves and 
droughts normally cannot straightforwardly destroy 
elements of the power system, unless the temperature 
reaches extremely high, they can significantly increase 
the cooling/air conditioning consumption while decrease 
the generation capacity of hydrological power plants. 
However, under extreme situations, flood can damage or 
put out of service the underground substations or control 
centers, whereas heat waves may trip transformers or 
overhead lines due to the temperature protection or short 
circuits caused by the elongation of the wires. 
Geomagnetic storms usually damage bulk power system 
associated with transformers. In terms of the winter 
storm, the ice may result in the damage of transmission 
towers or short circuits in substations. Table 1 shows the 
potential impact on power system from almost all 
common natural threats, which is based on the 
assumption that all the events are serious 
Table 1  Natural threats in power system: threatened 
components and impact 
 
 
3. DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL HAZARDS 
 
The occurrence of adverse natural events is random and 
irregular, but it was recorded with an upward trend in the 
last decades [16]. According to reference [17], the total 
number of adverse natural events showed an ascendant 
overall trend during recent 60 years (1950-2010). There 
are 450 events in the year 2010, which is 18 times than 
the number of the year 1950.    
 
Besides the increasing frequency, natural hazards 
manifest in various forms and in different locations. In 
order to visualize the main natural hazards of each 
country/region, a map (Figure 2) with main natural 
threats of each country in the world was created based on 
the information collected from Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) [18]. 
Furthermore, we provided another map with a special 
focus on Europe (Figure 3). 
 
In terms of the criteria for coloring each country, it is 
according to the number of occurrence of adverse natural 
events (earthquake, volcano, flood, drought, 
avalanche/landslide and tropical cyclone) happened from 
1974 to 2003.To justify the frequent natural 
disaster/disasters for each country, we provided Table 2 
to divide three levels of frequency according to the 
occurrence of natural disasters. If the frequency of a 
natural disaster reaches “Moderate Frequency” or even 
“High Frequency” in Table 2 [16], we defined the 
natural disaster as the main natural threat in this country. 
 
Taking China and Italy for instances, based on Table 3 
which presents the occurrence of natural disasters in 
those two countries, we can conclude that earthquakes, 
floods, droughts, avalanches/landslides and tropical 
cyclones are the main natural threats in China, while 
earthquakes, floods, avalanches/landslides and volcanoes 
are the typical natural threats in Italy.    
 
Figure 2. Main natural threats in the world 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Main natural threats in Europe 
 
Table 2. Frequency levels for the different natural 
disasters 
 
 
Table 3. The occurrence of natural disasters in China 
and Italy 
 
 
4. IMPORTANT HISTORIC POWER SYSTEMS 
FAILURES DUE TO NATURAL DISASTERS 
 
Table 4 shows some historical instances of natural 
hazards and how they brought the huge loss to power 
systems and the society. 
 
 
 Table 4. Major adverse natural events against power 
systems 
 
 
The tropical cyclones happened in 1982 and 1992 are 
two of the most severe natural disasters which posed 
huge threats to America’s power grid. The total 
economic loss reached to about 2 G$, and the failure of 
critical equipment of power system caused a blackout for 
a few days [19], [20]. The winter storm happened on 1st 
April 1998 in North American caused 7.4 G$ of 
economic loss, 980 casualties, 5 million people without 
electricity up to one month [21]. In addition, more than 
3.5 thousand poles, 5 thousand transformers, and 1.3 
thousand steel pylons were in need of repair [22]. The 
Indonesia Ocean tsunami of 16th December 2004 
affected 1.7 million people, injured and killed 226,560 
residents. Moreover, it produced 9.3 G$ of economic 
losses, caused the power outage for 0.17 million power 
subscribers for 14 days, and resulted in abnormal 
operation at three power plants [23], [24]. Japan suffered 
from a large earthquake of magnitude 9.0 on 11th March 
2011, and it brought about 15,641 casualties, 9.3 G$ of 
economic loss, and no electricity for 7 million customers 
at the peak time. Additionally, three-hour blocks of 
rolling blackouts were enacted sporadically throughout 
10 prefectures during the summer of 2011 [25], [26]. A 
severe heat wave happened in Europe in June 2003 and 
continued through July until mid-August, which raised 
summer temperatures by 20% to 30% higher than the 
seasonal average temperature [27]. It also affected a 
large area which was extended from northern Spain to 
the Czech Republic [27]. With a death toll more than 30 
thousand, the heat wave of 2003 become one of the most 
serious natural disasters in Europe for the last 100 years, 
and it ended up with a great financial loss at 14.5 G$ 
[28]. Moreover, four nuclear power plants were forced to 
shut down because of the dramatic rise temperature of 
rivers used to cool the reactors, which engendered to loss 
4 GW power generation during the summer of 2003 [28]. 
Although there was no direct damage to the 
infrastructures of power systems, electricity demands 
dramatically soared due to the cooling loads. 
 
A more complicated situation is that sometimes 
blackouts are attributed to combinations of multiple 
natural disasters. They are more complex than a single 
one as they often involve cascading events. 
Explanatorily, the primary failure triggers a sequence of 
secondary failures and failures of propagation will 
finally lead to a blackout in a large area. The event 
happened on 17th January 2011 in Australia was a 
typical instance. A tropical cyclone was first identified in 
the Gulf of Carpentaria on January 17th, but it became 
destructive wind and produced over 1,000 mm of rainfall 
in some areas during48 hours. The major flooding within 
following weeks caused 133.8 GW power outages, l.7 
G$ economic loss and great impact on 0.3 million power 
customers [29].  
 
5. GEOREFERENCED MODEL FOR NATURAL 
THREATS ANALYSIS: AN APPLICATION TO 
THE ITALIAN POWER SYSTEM  
 
Georeferenced models in power systems are used for 
planning, reinforcing, monitoring, and managing the 
transmission networks. The sophisticated spatial analysis 
is greatly useful for formulating scenarios, determining 
optimum generation potential, studying environmental 
impact, and managing facility assets. Owing to the 
geographically-oriented view which combines the electric 
generation with transmission structures, devices, and 
network, a georeferenced model not only can be applied 
to the stability, protection and coordination, contingency 
analysis, and economic modeling, but also helps utilities 
to discover new issues about the investments and risks of 
building a transmission network, and allows the 
simultaneous assessment of technical, financial, and 
environmental factors [30]. 
 
The georeferenced model improves visualization of 
power systems by associating spatial data with 
transmission assets to display geographically referenced 
real-time power system data such as the voltage and line 
flow monitoring. Geographical information is stored in 
geographical map layers making it easy to integrate 
relevant information such as weather, vegetation growth, 
and road networks with related transmission network. 
Data of real-time weather integrated into a geographical 
map of power system increases the operator’s situational 
awareness. For example, with the help of such model, the 
identification of a natural threat front moving towards a 
given area enables operators to rapidly determine 
transmission facilities with increased risks of outage [31]. 
  
Before introducing the Italian power system 
georeferenced model, the first thing is to be familiar with 
the typical disasters in Italy, and its electricity system. 
 
Italy is a disaster-prone country with a high frequency of 
volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, floods and landslides. 
There are three active volcanoes named Mount Etna, 
Stromboli, and Mount Vesuvius, and six dormant 
volcanoes situated in southern part of Italy [32]. It is 
noted that Mount Etna and Stromboli are in an almost 
constant state of activity. The volcanic eruption which 
happened from 12th July 2001 and lasted for 24 days in 
Etna causing significant damage, mostly to the cable-car 
and ski-lifts located between 1.9 thousand and 2.6 
thousand meters on the southern flank of the volcano 
[32]. In terms of the earthquakes, from 1900 to 2010, 
earthquakes which are over 5.8 magnitudes happened 14 
times and led to the fatalities achieving to around 0.1 
million [33]. The Irpinia earthquake which took place on 
23rd November 1980 (MS=6.9) caused about 3 thousand 
people dead, the destruction of 15 towns and severe 
damage within a radius near 50 km [34]. The flood, 
which happened in the Valle d’Aosta, Piedmont and 
Liguria Regions (north-western Italy) during13-16 
October 2000, led to 35 deaths, 25 missing people and 5 
thousands million Euros economic loss [35].With regard 
to the catastrophic landslide within Italy, it occurred on 
the southern slope of the Vajont dam reservoir on 9th 
October 1963. Almost 1.9 thousand people lost their lives 
during this event [36]. 
 
Italy's total installed generation capacity was 124,750 
MW in 2013 [37]. Conventional thermal plants produced 
80%, hydroelectric 17%, and other sources (non-nuclear) 
about 3% of the demand [38]. The consumption of 
electricity in 2013 was 297.3 TWh while net national 
production was 278.8 TWh [37], the rest was depended 
on the import.  
  
In order to study the impact of natural threats on Italian 
power systems, especially the northwest part of Italy, we 
developed fully georeferenced models of the Italian 
transmission system with four typical power/demand 
snapshots (winter peak, winter off-peak, summer peak, 
summer off-peak) in 2014, then the worst case (in terms 
of post-contingency severity) “winter peak” was chosen. 
The georeferenced model of “winter peak” snapshot is 
shown in Figure 4. This snapshot contains a complete set 
of buses and branches (lines, transformers) of the 220-
380 kV Italian transmission network.] Besides, network 
structures of important neighboring countries are 
simplified (The total numbers of buses, generators, lines, 
and transformers are around 1.2, 0.24, 1.4, and 0.2 
thousand respectively). The maximum error of the power 
flow results, compared with the real network situation, is 
less than 2%. In order to combine the power system with 
the geographic information [39], the longitude and 
latitude of each bus, generator, and transmission tower 
were found from Google maps and mapped into the 
Italian power transmission network. Therefore, this 
model gives the precise location of each element in the 
system. Overall, the georeferenced model is highly 
similar to the network that is being used by the Italian 
transmission system operator (Terna S.p.A) for operation 
from the perspective of the static power flow. 
 
 
Figure 4. The georeferenced model of Italian power 
grid with administrative map 
 
5.1 Winter storm in the Alps 
 
The first case represents an extreme weather situation 
when the temperature in the Alps reaches -45°C and the 
snowfall achieves to 11.5 m (according to the most 
extreme record in the Alps). The transmission corridor 
links up Switzerland with Italy by two lines (one from 
SRIDDE21 to IVALTA21 and the other one from 
SRIDDE21 to IAVITA21) passing through the Alps with 
the average altitude around 3.5 thousand meters (Figure 
5). The towers for these two lines are hypothesized to be 
overwhelmed by the accumulated snow under this 
weather condition, so the two connections along this 
corridor with Switzerland are interrupted. 
 
 
Figure 5. Italy-Switzerland electricity corridor 
(SRIDDE21-IVALTA21-IAVITA21 
 
The contingency analysis shows that an additional loss of 
lines can trigger system violations with high potentials to 
develop a blackout (Table 5). As an example, we report 
the overloads in Table 6 after tripping line ISGSR111-
ITERR111. The highest line flow can reach 210.9% of 
the rated MVA while no voltage violation is observed. 
 
 Table 5. Impact of top 5 contingencies in terms of 
branch overload 
 
 
 Table 6. Branch overload after tripping line 
ISGSR111-ITERR111 
 
 
Figure 6 shows, as an example, the visual comparison of 
the power flow before and after the contingencies. 
Manifestly, the contingency impacts the central part more 
severe than the rest of the country. 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of power flow distribution for 
tripping line ISGSR111 - ITERR111 
(a) Power flow distribution in normal state 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of power flow distribution for 
tripping line ISGSR111 - ITERR111 
(b) Power flow distribution after tripping line ISGSR111 - 
ITERR111 
 
Besides the above reported severe contingencies which 
can directly cause serious violations, there are also 
potential risks to cause the collapse of transmission 
towers in the same area under the same weather situation. 
After the disconnection of the two considered tie-lines, 
power flows over the lines in the same area would 
decrease. This further leads to hinder melting the ice over 
the transmission lines. Then the accumulated ice would 
collapse the towers. To show the consequence, we 
present the result of the power flow on line IAVITA21 -
IVLNT121 as displayed in Table 7. It presents situations 
before and after the disconnection of the tie-lines, and the 
result is that corresponding power flow is decreased. 
 
 Table 7. Power flow on line IAVITA21 -IVLNT121 
before and after opening the tie-lines  
 
 
5.2 Dam collapse in France 
 
In the second case we consider a flood caused by the 
collapse of the dam of the hydroelectric reservoir of Lac 
Du Mont Cenis (the total storable volume amounts to 
about 320 million cubic meters, and the highest position 
is above sea level 2000 meters), which would involve 
densely populated urban areas   such as cities of Turin, 
Vercelli, Alessandria, etc. Figure 7 presents the possible 
areas affected by the flood with the blue surface. 
 
Figure 7. Areas affected by the flood caused by collapse of 
the Lac Du Mont Cenis dam 
 
We preliminarily selected 25 important substations in the 
affected areas for the contingency set (ICHIT, IVNST, 
ICSNT, IPIOTA, IGRUTA, IMATT, IMAAT, IMOCT, 
IPELT, IPIATA, IPLTT, ISANT, ISTUT, ITCAT, 
ITCRT, ITOCT, ITONT, ITOWT, ITOST, ITRNT, 
ISLVT, IGERT, IFMIT, and IBALT). Table 8 reports a 
set of representative contingencies. The system will 
suffer from just one line flow violation when 
disconnecting substation ITONT alone, and the violation 
achieves 124%. The isolation of all 25 substations 
disconnects the highest load (1.13 GW), generation (1.69 
GW) and the largest set of isolating buses (38 buses). 
While disconnecting the substations individually, the 
largest disconnected load reaches 207 MW but with the 
lowest amount of isolated bus (2 isolated buses) when 
isolating the substation ISTUT, and the largest 
disconnected generation arrives at 740 MW when 
isolating the substation ITRNT. 
 
 Table 8. Power flow on line IAVITA21-IVLNT121 
before and after opening the tie-lines 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the negative consequence caused the 
flood. In Figure 8, the change of system voltage around 
affected areas can be observed, and it also implies the 
geographic coverage of the blackout with the 
administrative information. It is manifest that cities of 
Turin and Alessandria would be affected more heavily 
than other regions. 
 
 
Figure 8. Visualized comparison of voltage profile around 
the affected area 
(a) Voltage visualization around affected area before 
the event 
 
Figure 8. Visualized comparison of voltage profile around 
the affected area 
(b) Voltage visualization around affected area after 
the event 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
Although no single failure will have a significant effect 
on the electricity system considering most utilities 
maintain sufficient generation and transmission reserves 
to withstand such failures, if a diversity of events (both 
natural and manmade) brings on several damages, 
substations, the transmission system and even loads 
would suffer from a great loss. Adverse natural events, 
as the unneglectable risk for power systems, happen 
rarely but their occurrences will lead to enormous losses 
for the society.  
 
The large geographical exposure of power systems in the 
natural environment indicates the vulnerability of power 
grids when facing destructive adverse natural events. 
They do not only directly damage power facilities, but 
may also lead to blackouts through cascading failures. 
This would further result in huge economic loss and a 
large number of casualties. The gradually increasing 
population and electricity demand have a tendency to 
ascend losses for each country around the world. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have appropriate approaches 
and models to work on the influences of natural disasters 
on the power system. A possible way to achieve this is to 
put power systems data and geographical information 
together to establish the georeferenced model. The 
benefit is to allow us to plan, design, reinforce and 
manage power systems in a holistic way.     
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